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I. INTRODUCTION 
The life of the law has not been logic; it has been experience. 
—Oliver Wendell Holmes, Jr.1 
[A] page of history is worth a volume of logic. 
—Oliver Wendell Holmes, Jr.2 
 
These quotes are familiar and famous aphorisms of Supreme Court 
Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes, Jr.  They warn against an overly 
formalistic approach to the law, characterized by rote recitation of black-
and-white legal rules and no consideration of the real world within which 
such legal rules operate.  These warnings have not been heeded in the 
legal context of Title VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, which protects 
individuals from discrimination on the basis of race by any program or 
entity receiving federal funding. 
Imagine, now, that a hypothetical School A receives funding from 
the United States Department of Education.  Suppose School A has a 
policy, governing the distribution of these federal funds, that prohibits 
distribution of funds to any student organization composed primarily of 
racial minorities—in other words, if a majority of the members of a 
given student organization are racial minorities, then it will not receive 
any funding from the school.  Most people would find such a policy to be 
repugnant to public policy and would be unsurprised to learn that a 
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private individual could bring suit under Title VI to enforce its protection 
against the discrimination.3 
Imagine, however, that School A tweaks its policy slightly.  Instead 
of expressly basing its policy on race, suppose that it bases the policy on 
the size of the student organization.  For example, the policy may 
prohibit the distribution of funds to any student organization that has a 
total membership of less than one percent of the school’s total 
population.  This policy may seem innocuous on its face.  The policy 
may, however, have the same effect as the policy expressly based on 
race—that is, no funding for student organizations composed primarily 
of racial minorities.  School A may be racially homogenous, and student 
organizations composed primarily of minorities may not have a total 
membership equal to or greater than one percent of School A’s total 
population.  Perhaps School A tweaked its policy in this way to achieve 
the same result without expressly basing its policy on race, thereby 
avoiding suit under Title VI.  Surely such a policy is no less repugnant to 
public policy than one expressly based on race, particularly when the 
underlying motive for each policy is the same. 
As it turns out, private individuals may bring suit under Title VI only 
to challenge policies that expressly (intentionally) discriminate on the 
basis of race.4  Title VI does not reach a policy that has a 
disproportionally adverse (disparate) impact on particular racial groups, 
so long as the policy does not intentionally discriminate on the basis of 
race—such as the second hypothetical policy outlined above.  Title VI 
does, however, direct federal agencies distributing federal funds—such 
as the Department of Education—to pass regulations effectuating the 
goal, or purpose, of Title VI.5 
Suppose that the Department of Education, pursuant to this directive, 
has passed a regulation prohibiting policies that have a disparate impact 
on particular racial groups.  Such regulations are common,6 but the 
United States Supreme Court has held that private individuals cannot 
bring suit under Title VI to enforce them.7  This appears to allow School 
A to achieve its discriminatory objective by merely masking its 
discriminatory intent.  This approach to Title VI fails to consider the 
                                                          
 3.  See infra Part II.B.1. 
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 5.  See infra Part II.A.1. 
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(Department of Transportation regulation). 
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real-world context in which legal rules operate, which is precisely the 
evil that Justice Holmes warned against.  This Comment advocates an 
alternative mechanism for enforcing regulations that prohibit policies 
having a disparate impact on certain racial groups: the § 1983 action.8  
Use of § 1983 to enforce disparate impact regulations would replace an 
overly formalistic approach to Title VI with a functional approach that 
better meets the overall goals and purpose of Title VI and fits within 
existing precedent.  Furthermore, adoption of this functionalist approach 
is warranted, because the current, overly formalistic approach is based on 
an untenable distinction between intentional and disparate impact 
discrimination. 
Part II provides an overview of the areas of law pertinent to this 
Comment—Title VI and § 1983.9  Part II.A outlines the relevant 
statutory provisions.  Part II.B examines case law that is relevant to the 
statutory provisions outlined in Part II.A.  Part II.C discusses the circuit 
split that has developed over the application of § 1983 to enforce federal 
regulations promulgated under Title VI. 
Part III analyzes the justification for using § 1983 to enforce 
regulations prohibiting disparate impact discrimination.  Part III.A 
examines the functionalist virtues of allowing § 1983 actions to enforce 
disparate impact regulations.  Part III.B notes that allowing such use of § 
1983 fits within existing precedent.  Part III.C demonstrates that such a 
use of § 1983 is both justified and needed because the current state of 
Title VI law is based on an untenable distinction between intentional and 
disparate impact discrimination.  Finally, Part IV concludes by briefly 
summarizing these arguments and advocating, once more, for the use of 
§ 1983 to enforce regulations prohibiting disparate impact 
discrimination. 
                                                          
 8.  This alternative suggestion is not new.  See Bradford C. Mank, Using § 1983 to Enforce 
Title VI’s Section 602 Regulations, 49 U. KAN. L. REV. 321 (2001).  Professor Mank provides a 
more in-depth analysis than this Comment of all elements required in a § 1983 action.  Professor 
Mank makes the argument, as does this Comment, that § 602 disparate impact regulations create 
enforceable rights that are required for a § 1983 action.  Id. at 365–67.  Professor Mank’s article, 
however, was written before two key Supreme Court decisions relevant to the analysis here.  See 
Gonzaga v. Doe, 536 U.S. 273 (2002); Alexander v. Sandoval, 532 U.S. 275 (2001).  In fact, 
Professor Mank’s analysis relies on the district court case that the Supreme Court overturned in 
Sandoval.  Mank, supra, at 366–67.  This Comment, then, in some sense, revisits many of the 
arguments made in Professor Mank’s article and assesses their viability given key developments in 
Supreme Court precedent and Title VI and § 1983 law. 
 9.  42 U.S.C. § 1983 (2006). 
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II. BACKGROUND 
Although both areas of law relevant to this Comment—Title VI and 
§ 1983—are based on statutory provisions, they are not the sole authority 
in either area.  Cases applying each statute have developed the body of 
law in both the Title VI and § 1983 context. 
A. The Relevant Statutory Provisions 
1. Title VI: The Statutory Basis for the Individual Right to Be Free 
from all Types of Racial Discrimination 
Section 601 of Title VI provides that “No person in the United States 
shall, on the ground of race, color, or national origin, be excluded from 
participation in, be denied the benefits of, or be subjected to 
discrimination under any program or activity receiving Federal financial 
assistance.”10  Section 602 of Title VI provides, in part: 
Each Federal department and agency which is empowered to extend 
Federal financial assistance to any program or activity, by way of grant, 
loan, or contract other than a contract of insurance or guaranty, is 
authorized and directed to effectuate the provisions of section [601] . . . 
with respect to such program or activity by issuing rules, regulations, or 
orders of general applicability which shall be consistent with 
achievement of the objectives of the statute authorizing the financial 
assistance in connection with which the action is taken.11 
Section 602’s reference to § 601—directing federal agencies to 
promulgate regulations effectuating the provisions of § 601—makes 
clear that the two provisions do not operate wholly independently of one 
another.  As § 602 regulations are to be promulgated to effectuate the 
provisions of § 601, they may, in some sense, elucidate the content of § 
601.  Section 602 regulations therefore cannot be understood without 
reference to § 601 and how the regulations are intended to effectuate 
those provisions.  Simply put, § 601 may be understood as the end goal 
and § 602 regulations as the means by which to accomplish it. 
Pursuant to § 602, several federal departments and agencies have 
issued rules, regulations, or orders of general applicability prohibiting 
funding recipients from utilizing “criteria or methods of administration 
which have the effect of subjecting individuals to discrimination because 
                                                          
 10.  Id. § 2000d. 
 11.  Id. § 2000d-1. 
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of their race, color, or national origin.”12  These regulations prohibit 
disparate impact discrimination by entities receiving federal funding 
from a federal department or agency having such a regulation. 
The Supreme Court has held that an implied private cause of action 
may be used to enforce § 601, but not § 602 disparate impact 
regulations.13  Although there is no private cause of action to enforce the 
regulations passed pursuant to § 602, there may be other mechanisms by 
which private individuals can seek enforcement of those regulations.14  
One potential alternative is the use of § 1983 to enforce regulations 
passed pursuant to § 602.15 
2. 42 U.S.C. § 1983: The Mechanism for Enforcing Individual Federal 
Rights 
Section 1983 provides, in pertinent part: 
Every person who, under color of any statute, ordinance, regulation, 
custom, or usage, of any State . . . subjects, or causes to be subjected, 
any citizen of the United States or other person within the jurisdiction 
thereof to the deprivation of any rights, privileges, or immunities 
secured by the Constitution and laws, shall be liable to the party injured 
in an action at law, suit in equity, or other proceeding for redress . . . .16 
Section 1983 therefore, by its own terms, provides a private cause of 
action for individuals to enforce the “rights, privileges, or immunities 
secured by the Constitution and [federal] laws.”17  As is clear from the 
quoted portion of the statute, a § 1983 claim requires more than a 
violation of a federal right,18 but this Comment will focus on only that 
element of a claim. 
Section 1983 does not create any federal substantive rights; rather, it 
was intended to provide a remedy for the violation of rights secured by 
the Constitution or a federal statute.19  Rights secured by federal statute, 
                                                          
 12.  28 C.F.R. § 42.104 (2011) (Department of Justice regulation); see also 49 C.F.R. § 21.5 
(2011) (Department of Transportation regulation). 
 13.  See infra Part II.B. 
 14.  See infra Part II.B. 
 15.  See infra Part II.B. 
 16.  42 U.S.C. § 1983 (2006). 
 17.  Id. 
 18.  See Martin A. Schwartz, Fundamentals of Section 1983 Litigation, in 25TH ANNUAL 
SECTION 1983 CIVIL RIGHTS LITIGATION 5–14 (George C. Pratt & Martin A. Schwartz, co-chairs, 
Practising Law Institute 2008) (providing an overview of the elements of a § 1983 claim). 
 19.  Id. at 16. 
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enforceable by a § 1983 action, may include those rights secured by Title 
VI.20 
B. The Relevant Case Law 
1. Title VI Case Law 
Part II.B.1 examines the case law that has led to the development of 
the present state of Title VI law.  This case law makes clear that Title VI 
contains an implied private cause of action to enforce § 601.21  This case 
law makes equally clear, however, that Title VI does not contain an 
implied private cause of action to enforce regulations promulgated 
pursuant to § 602.22  It is therefore unclear how, or if, private individuals 
may enforce § 602 disparate impact regulations. 
a. Cannon v. University of Chicago and the Genesis of Title VI’s 
Implied Private Cause of Action 
In Cannon v. University of Chicago,23 the Supreme Court held that 
Title IX of the Education Amendments of 197224 could be enforced by 
an implied private cause of action.25  Although Cannon dealt with Title 
IX, the Court’s reasoning makes clear that its holding applies with equal 
force to Title VI.26  The Court noted that Title IX had been patterned 
after Title VI and that the drafters of Title IX explicitly assumed that 
Title IX would be interpreted in the same manner as Title VI.27 
By the time Title IX was enacted, Title VI repeatedly had been 
interpreted to include an implied private cause of action, albeit by lower 
federal courts.28  Congress was—and is—assumed to know the law and 
legislate against that background.29  Coupling this assumption with the 
fact that Congress had explicitly and repeatedly referenced Title VI while 
                                                          
 20.  See Sam Spital, Note, Restoring Brown’s Promise of Equality After Alexander v. Sandoval: 
Why We Can’t Wait, 19 HARV. BLACKLETTER L.J. 93, 96 (2003) (stating a fair reading of the 
Supreme Court’s precedents allow a § 1983 action to enforce Title VI regulations). 
 21.  See infra Part II.B.1.a. 
 22.  See infra Part II.B.1.b. 
 23.  441 U.S. 677 (1979). 
 24.  20 U.S.C. §§ 1681–1688 (2006). 
 25.  Cannon, 441 U.S. at 717. 
 26.  Id. at 694–96. 
 27.  Id. at 696. 
 28.  Id. 
 29.  Id. at 696–98. 
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drafting Title IX, the Court felt “especially justified” in holding that Title 
IX contained an implied private cause of action.30  Implicit in, and a 
necessary condition to, this holding was the Court’s understanding that 
Title VI contains an implied cause of action.31  Cannon thus may stand 
for the proposition that Title VI contains an implied private cause of 
action. 
Beyond Cannon’s focus on legislative history, it also considered the 
statutory language of Title IX—and, by extension, Title VI—to be 
crucial to its holding that the statute contained an implied private cause 
of action.32  For a statute to contain a private cause of action, the statute 
must first confer a personal right, which the private cause of action is 
intended to enforce.33  Both Title VI and Title IX confer a personal 
right.34  Crucial to this determination was the fact that the language of 
both statutes focuses on the class for whose benefit they were enacted.35  
The language of Title VI and Title IX focuses on the benefitted class and 
its protection—“No person . . . shall . . . be subjected to 
discrimination”—and is different from a hypothetical statute that simply 
prohibits the recipients of federal funds from discriminating on the basis 
of race or sex.36  The language of such a hypothetical statute would not 
create a personal right and would counsel against finding an implied 
private cause of action for its enforcement.37  Statutory language 
conferring a personal right upon members of a benefitted class—
potentially enforceable by a private cause of action—almost certainly has 
to be phrased in terms that focus on the benefitted class.38  Because both 
Title VI and Title IX are phrased in such language, the Court found that 
they conferred a personal right upon members of the benefitted class and 
went on to imply a private cause of action to enforce that conferred 
right.39 
                                                          
 30.  Id. at 697. 
 31.  The Court, in effect, holds that Title IX contains an implied private cause of action because 
its drafters explicitly and repeatedly referenced Title VI.  Such references to Title VI would be 
meaningless, as to the question of whether Title IX contained an implied private cause of action, if 
Title VI was not understood to contain an implied private cause of action.  Id. at 694–98. 
 32.  Id. at 689–94. 
 33.  Id. at 690 n.13. 
 34.  20 U.S.C. § 1681 (2006); 42 U.S.C. § 2000d. 
 35.  See Cannon, 441 U.S. at 690. 
 36.  Id.; see also id. at 690–93. 
 37.  See id. at 691 (“There would be far less reason to infer a private remedy in favor of 
individual persons if Congress, instead of drafting Title IX with an unmistakable focus on the 
benefited class . . . .”). 
 38.  Id. at 690 n.13. 
 39.  Id. at 709. 
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Both the Supreme Court and Congress have affirmed the holding 
from Cannon that Title VI contains an implied private cause of action.40  
The Supreme Court, after Cannon, has explicitly recognized an implied 
private cause of action to enforce Title VI.41  Furthermore, Congress 
effectively recognized a private cause of action to enforce Title VI when 
it abrogated state sovereign immunity, in § 1003 of the Rehabilitation 
Act Amendments of 1986,42 for violations of Title VI.43  It is therefore 
clear that Title VI is enforceable through an implied private cause of 
action.  The scope of this implied private cause of action, however, is 
limited.44 
b. Alexander v. Sandoval and the Limitation of Title VI’s Implied 
Private Cause of Action to Cases of Intentional Discrimination 
In Alexander v. Sandoval, the Supreme Court limited the scope of the 
implied private cause of action to enforce Title VI.45  In Sandoval, the 
issue before the Court was whether an implied private cause of action 
existed to enforce disparate impact regulations promulgated pursuant to § 
602 of Title VI.46  The Court ultimately concluded that it did not.47  
Because Sandoval’s analysis of Title VI is highly relevant to the question 
of whether § 1983 may be used to enforce § 602 disparate impact 
regulations, a close examination of the Sandoval opinion is warranted. 
The facts of Sandoval are straightforward.  In 1990, during the 
“English-only” movement, Alabama amended its constitution to make 
English the official language of Alabama.48  Pursuant to this amendment, 
the Alabama Department of Public Safety decided to administer state 
driver’s license examinations only in English.49  The Alabama 
Department of Public Safety had accepted funding from the United 
States Departments of Justice and Transportation, thereby subjecting 
                                                          
 40.  See infra Part II.B.1.b. 
 41.  See infra Part II.B.1.b. 
 42.  42 U.S.C. § 2000d-7 (2006). 
 43.  See Franklin v. Gwinnett Cnty. Pub. Sch., 503 U.S. 60, 72 (1992) (stating that 42 U.S.C. § 
2000d-7 “cannot be read except as a validation of Cannon’s holding.”). 
 44.  See infra Part II.B.1.b. 
 45.  532 U.S. 275, 293 (2001) (holding that the implied private cause of action may not be used 
to enforce disparate impact regulations promulgated pursuant to § 602). 
 46.  Id. at 279. 
 47.  Id. at 293. 
 48.  Id. at 278–79. 
 49.  Id. at 279. 
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itself to the provisions of Title VI.50  Both the Departments of Justice and 
Transportation had promulgated regulations, pursuant to § 602, 
prohibiting funding recipients from administering the funds in a manner 
that had the effect of discriminating on the basis of race, color, or 
national origin.51  These regulations prohibited disparate impact, in 
addition to intentional, discrimination.52  Sandoval brought suit seeking 
to enjoin the English-only policy.53  Sandoval argued that the English-
only policy had the effect of discriminating against non-English speakers 
on the basis of national origin, in violation of the disparate impact 
regulations promulgated pursuant to § 602.54  Both the district court and 
the Eleventh Circuit ruled in favor of Sandoval, and an appeal to the 
Supreme Court followed.55 
As an initial matter, the Supreme Court took as given three aspects of 
Title VI.56  First, the Court found it well settled that an implied private 
cause of action is available to enforce § 601 of Title VI.57  Second, the 
Court’s precedents made clear that § 601 prohibits only intentional 
discrimination—not disparate impact discrimination.58  Third, the Court 
assumed that § 602 regulations—like those at issue in Sandoval—could 
validly prohibit disparate impact discrimination, even though § 601 
permits it and prohibits only intentional discrimination.59  The issue, 
then, was whether an implied private cause of action was available to 
enforce the valid disparate impact regulations promulgated pursuant to § 
602.60 
The Court began its analysis by rejecting the claim that the Court’s 
precedents required it to find that an implied private cause of action 
existed to enforce § 602 disparate impact regulations.61  The Court 
                                                          
 50.  Id. at 278. 
 51.  Id. (citing 28 C.F.R. § 42.104(b)(2) (2011) (Department of Justice regulation); 49 C.F.R. § 
21.5(b)(2) (Department of Transportation regulation)). 
 52.  See id. at 281 (stating the regulations prohibited activities having a disparate impact on 
racial groups and are assumed to be valid under § 602). 
 53.  Id. at 279. 
 54.  Id. 
 55.  Id. 
 56.  Id. 
 57.  Id. at 279–80. 
 58.  Id. at 280–81. 
 59.  Id. at 281–82.  This Comment does not address whether § 602 disparate impact regulations 
are valid, but other commentators have discussed the issue.  See, e.g., Bradford C. Mank, Are Title 
VI’s Disparate Impact Regulations Valid?, 71 U. CIN. L. REV. 517 (2002) (arguing that such 
regulations are valid). 
 60.  Sandoval, 532 U.S. at 279. 
 61.  Id. at 282. 
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interpreted its precedents to hold only that an implied private cause of 
action is available to enforce Title VI’s ban on intentional 
discrimination.62  The Court’s precedents were silent on—or had never 
reached—the issue of whether the implied private cause of action 
extended to § 602 regulations prohibiting disparate impact 
discrimination.63  Thus, precedent did not require the Court to find that 
the implied private cause of action extended to those regulations. 
The Court then considered whether Congress intended for a private 
cause of action to enforce § 602 regulations prohibiting disparate impact 
discrimination.64  The Court, given its assumptions about Title VI,65 
ultimately concluded that Congress had not so intended.66  The private 
cause of action to enforce § 601’s prohibition on intentional 
discrimination, according to the Court, undoubtedly extended to § 602 
regulations also prohibiting intentional discrimination.67  Because § 601 
prohibits intentional discrimination, § 602 regulations prohibiting the 
same were deemed an authoritative construction of § 601.68  “A Congress 
that intends [§ 601] to be enforced through a private cause of action,” the 
Court reasoned, “intends the authoritative interpretation of [§ 601] to be 
so enforced as well.”69 
Section 601, however, prohibits only intentional discrimination.70  
The Court therefore found that § 602 regulations prohibiting disparate 
impact discrimination are not authoritative constructions of, and do not 
apply to, § 601.71  Rather, they prohibit a type of discrimination that 
§ 601 permits.72  Because of this, the Court found it “clear that the 
private right of action to enforce § 601 does not include a private right to 
enforce” § 602 regulations prohibiting disparate impact discrimination.73  
A private cause of action to enforce § 602 regulations prohibiting 
disparate impact discrimination—a type of discrimination permitted by 
§ 601—“must come, if at all, from the independent force of § 602.”74 
                                                          
 62.  Id. at 282–84. 
 63.  Id. at 281–84. 
 64.  Id. at 284. 
 65.  See supra notes 566–590 and accompanying text. 
 66.  Sandoval, 532 U.S. at 284. 
 67.  Id. 
 68.  Id. 
 69.  Id. 
 70.  Id. at 280. 
 71.  Id. at 285. 
 72.  Id. 
 73.  Id. 
 74.  Id. at 286. 
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The Court held that congressional intent is the dispositive factor in 
determining whether § 602 contains an implied private cause of action to 
enforce disparate impact regulations promulgated thereunder.75  If 
Congress did not intend to provide such a remedy, the Court cannot 
imply or create it, even if such a remedy is desirable as a matter of public 
policy or appears compatible with Title VI as a whole.76  This reasoning 
exemplifies the Court’s overly formalistic approach to Title VI.  Only an 
overly formalistic approach would prohibit private enforcement by 
adhering to a legal rule that mandates a finding of congressional intent to 
create such a remedy, even though private enforcement is perfectly 
compatible with Title VI—in fact, private enforcement would further the 
overall goals and purpose of Title VI, as § 602 regulations are 
promulgated to effectuate the antidiscrimination provision of § 601. 
Under this overly formalistic approach, the Sandoval Court found 
that the text and structure of Title VI evinces no congressional intent to 
provide a private cause of action to enforce the disparate impact 
regulations promulgated under § 602.77  The language focusing on Title 
VI’s protected class, which was crucial to Cannon’s holding that § 601 
confers federal rights and contains a private cause of action to enforce 
those rights,78 is absent from § 602.79  Instead, the language of § 602 
focuses on the federal agencies that distribute federal funds and regulate 
the recipients, which, according to the Court, evinces no intent to confer 
rights, much less a private cause of action to enforce them.80  
Furthermore, the Court interpreted § 602 to limit federal agencies to 
“effectuat[ing] rights already created by § 601.”81  Congress therefore 
could not have intended a private cause of action to enforce rights 
created independent of § 601, such as those rights created by § 602 
disparate impact regulations.82 
In addition to the text of § 602, the Court found that its structure 
counseled against finding an implied private cause of action.83  Section 
                                                          
 75.  Id. 
 76.  Id. at 286–88. 
 77.  Id. at 289. 
 78.  See 42 U.S.C. § 2000d (2006) (“No person . . . shall . . . be subjected to 
discrimination . . . .”). 
 79.  Sandoval, 532 U.S. at 288–89. 
 80.  Id. (citing Univs. Research Ass’n, Inc. v. Coutu, 450 U.S. 754, 772 (1981)); see 42 U.S.C. 
§ 2000d-1 (“Each Federal . . . agency . . . is . . . directed to effectuate the provisions of 
[§ 601] . . . .”). 
 81.  Sandoval, 532 U.S. at 289 (alteration in original) (internal quotation marks omitted). 
 82.  Id. 
 83.  Id. at 289–90. 
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602 explicitly provides methods by which to enforce regulations 
promulgated thereunder.84  These explicit methods of enforcement are 
subject to “elaborate” restrictions, which, to the Court, suggested that 
Congress did not intend to provide a private cause of action to enforce 
§ 602 regulations.85 
In response to the argument that § 602 regulations create rights and 
therefore must be enforceable by a private cause of action, the Court held 
that although a regulation may invoke a statutorily created private cause 
of action for its enforcement, a regulation may not create a private cause 
of action that Congress did not authorize.86  Finally, the Court rejected 
the argument that Congress had “ratified” previous decisions finding a 
private cause of action to enforce § 602 disparate impact regulations.87  
This argument failed because, as the Court had explained, its previous 
decisions had not, in fact, found, or even assumed, a private cause of 
action existed to enforce § 602 disparate impact regulations.88 
Justice Stevens, joined by three other Justices, dissented from the 
decision in Sandoval.89  The dissent disagreed with nearly every step of 
the majority’s analysis.  First, the dissent argued that the Court’s 
precedents supported a finding that § 602 disparate impact regulations 
are enforceable by a private cause of action.90  Next, the dissent argued 
that the text and structure of Title VI supported finding a private cause of 
action to enforce § 602 disparate impact regulations91 and that Congress 
intended to provide a private cause of action to enforce such 
regulations.92  Finally, the dissent argued that all § 602 regulations—not 
just those prohibiting intentional discrimination—define the scope of 
rights enforceable by a private cause of action.93 
Interestingly, the dissent suggested that § 602 disparate impact 
regulations may still be enforced by a § 1983 action.94  In his dissent, 
Justice Stevens stated that “litigants who in the future wish to enforce the 
Title VI regulations against state actors in all likelihood must only 
                                                          
 84.  See 42 U.S.C. § 2000d-1. 
 85.  Sandoval, 532 U.S. at 290. 
 86.  Id. at 291. 
 87.  Id. 
 88.  Id. 
 89.  Id. at 293 (Stevens, J., dissenting). 
 90.  Id. at 295. 
 91.  Id. at 304. 
 92.  Id. at 305–06. 
 93.  Id. at 315. 
 94.  Id. at 299–300. 
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reference § 1983 to obtain relief . . . .”95  The majority addressed only the 
issue of whether § 602 contains an implied private cause of action to 
enforce disparate impact regulations promulgated thereunder;96 the 
majority said nothing about whether § 1983 may be used to enforce 
§ 602 disparate impact regulations.97  It would thus appear that § 1983 
provides a potential alternative for enforcing § 602 disparate impact 
regulations.98 
2. Section 1983 Case Law 
Although § 1983 may provide an alternative enforcement mechanism 
for § 602 disparate impact regulations, it remains to be seen whether 
§ 1983 is, in fact, an appropriate mechanism for doing so.  Section 1983 
case law makes clear that although § 1983 protects against both statutory 
and constitutional violations,99 it provides a remedy for violations of a 
federal right, not merely violations of a federal statute.100  The key 
question, then, in determining if § 1983 may be used to enforce § 602 
disparate impact regulations, is whether those regulations create, or 
define, federal rights.  Although various factors may help determine 
whether a federal statute creates a federal right,101 a federal statute does 
so only if it unambiguously evinces congressional intent to do so.102 
If a federal statute is found to create a federal right, there is a strong 
presumption that § 1983 may be used to enforce that right.103  Although 
not addressed in this Comment, the presumption may be overcome by 
showing that Congress intended to foreclose § 1983 as a means of 
enforcement by either (1) explicitly so providing or (2) by providing a 
comprehensive remedial scheme that would be inconsistent with the use 
of § 1983 as a means of enforcement.104  As others have noted, Title VI 
                                                          
 95.  Id. at 300. 
 96.  Id. at 293 (majority opinion). 
 97.  See Spital, supra note 20, at 118 (“[N]o court has held that Sandoval resolves the question 
of whether § 602 [] regulations are enforceable under § 1983.”). 
 98.  Id. (“[T]he inquiry into Congressional intent in determining whether a statute confers a 
private cause of action is clearly distinct from the inquiry as to whether, combined with its 
regulations, it creates enforceable rights under § 1983.” (quoting Mank, supra note 8, at 323)). 
 99.  See infra Part II.B.2.a. 
 100.  See infra Part II.B.2.b. 
 101.  See infra Part II.B.2.c. 
 102.  See infra Part II.B.2.d. 
 103.  See Mank, supra note 8, at 334 (“[T]he Supreme Court has emphasized that once a court 
finds an enforceable right under the three-part test, there is a strong presumption against preclusion 
and in favor of enforcing those federal rights under § 1983.”). 
 104.  Id. at 336. 
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does not explicitly foreclose use of § 1983, and it is unlikely that Title 
VI’s remedial scheme is so comprehensive as to foreclose the use of 
§ 1983 as an enforcement mechanism if the statute creates rights.105 
a. Maine v. Thiboutot and the Most Expansive, Plain Language 
Interpretation of § 1983’s Reach as to Statutory Rights 
The issue before the Supreme Court in Maine v. Thiboutot was 
“whether § 1983 encompasses claims based on purely statutory 
violations of federal law.”106  In Thiboutot, the Thiboutots brought suit 
under § 1983, alleging that the State of Maine had deprived them of 
benefits due under the federal Social Security Act.107 
The Thiboutot Court held that § 1983 claims could be maintained 
based solely on violations of federal statutes.108  To reach this 
conclusion, the Court relied upon the plain language of § 1983.109  
Because § 1983 does not plainly limit which laws may support a claim, 
the Court held that a § 1983 claim could be maintained based solely on a 
violation of any federal statute.110  In addition to the plain language of 
§ 1983, the Court noted that its precedents suggested that § 1983 claims 
could be maintained based on “violations of federal statutory as well as 
constitutional law.”111 
b. Pennhurst State School & Hospital v. Halderman and the Limitation 
of § 1983 to Violations of Federal Rights 
In Pennhurst State School & Hospital v. Halderman,112 the Court 
found that the statutory provision at issue—passed pursuant to 
Congress’s spending power113—did not confer any substantive rights.114  
Because the statutory provision did not confer any substantive rights, the 
Court did not reach the question of whether § 1983 could be used to 
                                                          
 105.  See id. at 367–68 (explaining that Title VI’s remedial scheme does not preclude § 1983 
suits). 
 106.  448 U.S. 1, 3 (1980). 
 107.  Id. 
 108.  Id. at 4. 
 109.  Id. 
 110.  Id. at 5. 
 111.  Id. at 4. 
 112.  451 U.S. 1 (1981). 
 113.  Id. at 15. 
 114.  Id. at 11. 
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enforce those rights.115  The Court thus implied that § 1983 provides a 
remedy only for violations of federal rights, not merely violations of 
federal statutes. 
The Court further noted that the usual remedy for state 
noncompliance with federally imposed conditions under spending power 
legislation is an action by the federal government to terminate the 
funds—not a private cause of action, such as one under § 1983.116  
Although Thiboutot suggested that a § 1983 action could be maintained 
based on violation of a federal statute, the Pennhurst Court distinguished 
Thiboutot on the ground that Thiboutot involved the violation of a federal 
right, not just a statute.117  Because the Court did not decide that the 
statutory provision at issue in Pennhurst conferred any substantive 
federal rights, § 1983 was not available as an enforcement mechanism.118  
Pennhurst thus makes clear that use of § 1983 is limited to situations 
involving violations of federal rights.  The question then becomes 
whether a federal statute creates, or gives rise to, a federal right. 
c. Blessing v. Freestone and the Factors That Help Determine Whether 
a Federal Statute Creates a Federal Right 
In Blessing v. Freestone, the Supreme Court reiterated that a § 1983 
action may be maintained only for violation of a federal right, not merely 
violation of a federal statute.119  The Blessing Court then recognized 
three factors that the Court must consider in determining whether a 
statute or statutory provision gives rise to a federal right.120 
The first of these factors is whether Congress intended the statutory 
provision at issue to benefit the plaintiff.121  Second, the plaintiff must 
demonstrate that the right protected by the statutory provision is 
sufficiently well-defined to be judicially enforceable.122  Lastly, the 
statutory provision giving rise to the federal right must clearly impose a 
binding obligation on the states—that is, the statutory provision must be 
phrased as mandatory.123 
                                                          
 115.  Id. at 28 n.21. 
 116.  Id. at 28. 
 117.  Id. 
 118.  Id. 
 119.  520 U.S. 329, 340 (1997). 
 120.  Id. 
 121.  Id. 
 122.  Id. at 340–41. 
 123.  Id. at 341. 
802 KANSAS LAW REVIEW [Vol. 61 
A finding that a statutory provision gives rise to a federal right does 
not guarantee that the right is enforceable by a § 1983 action.124  Such a 
finding does, however, create a rebuttable presumption that the federal 
right is enforceable by a § 1983 action.125  This presumption may be 
overcome if Congress has (1) expressly prohibited a § 1983 action in the 
statutory provision itself or (2) impliedly done so “by creating a 
comprehensive enforcement scheme that is incompatible with individual 
enforcement under § 1983.”126 
d. Gonzaga University v. Doe and the More Stringent Standard for 
Determining Whether a Federal Statute Creates a Federal Right 
In Gonzaga University v. Doe, the Supreme Court provided further 
guidance for determining whether a statutory provision gives rise to 
federal rights enforceable by § 1983.127  The Gonzaga Court also 
established the relationship between implied private causes of action and 
§ 1983 actions.128  The Court first dealt with the issue of determining 
whether a statutory provision confers a federal right.  The Court rejected 
the argument that a statutory provision gives rise to a federal right so 
long as Congress intended for the statutory provision to “benefit” 
putative plaintiffs.129  Instead, a statutory provision confers a federal 
right, enforceable under § 1983, only if Congress “unambiguously” 
intends to do so.130  The focus must be on congressional intent to confer a 
right, which is something more than a benefit or interest.131 
In reaching this conclusion, the Gonzaga Court recognized that the 
three Blessing factors for determining whether a statutory provision 
confers a federal right, enforceable by a § 1983 action, had created much 
confusion.132  The Blessing factors had been interpreted to allow a § 1983 
claim “so long as the plaintiff falls within the general zone of interest 
that the statute is intended to protect.”133  Such an interpretation, 
according to the Gonzaga Court, was incompatible with Blessing’s 
                                                          
 124.  Id. 
 125.  Id. 
 126.  Id. 
 127.  536 U.S. 273, 283 (2002). 
 128.  Id. 
 129.  Id. at 282–83. 
 130.  Id. at 283. 
 131.  Id. 
 132.  Id. at 282–83. 
 133.  Id. at 283. 
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emphasis on the violation of rights as the basis for a § 1983 action, 
because interests and benefits do not rise to the level of being substantive 
rights.134  Thus, the three Blessing factors now appear relevant only to the 
extent that they “unambiguously” evince congressional intent to confer a 
federal right.135  This standard—requiring an unambiguously conferred 
right to support a § 1983 claim—creates a direct relationship between 
implied private causes of action and § 1983 claims.136 
The Gonzaga Court recognized that the inquiry of whether a 
statutory provision confers a right enforceable by a § 1983 action 
overlaps with the question of whether a particular statute contains an 
implied private cause of action.137  Determining whether a particular 
statute contains an implied private cause of action is a two-step 
inquiry.138  First, Congress must have “intended to create a federal 
right.”139  Second, assuming Congress intended to create a federal right, 
it must also have intended to create a private remedy in order for the 
Court to imply a private cause of action.140 
A § 1983 plaintiff need not demonstrate congressional intent to 
provide a private remedy.141  Section 1983 is itself a congressionally 
provided mechanism for enforcing rights secured by the Constitution and 
federal statutes.142  It is this feature of § 1983 that makes it an attractive 
alternative mechanism to enforce § 602 disparate impact regulations: it 
eliminates a formalistic rule requiring congressional intent to create a 
private remedy because § 1983 is itself the private remedy. 
To support a § 1983 action for violation of a right secured by federal 
statute, a plaintiff must initially demonstrate that Congress intended the 
statutory provision at issue to confer a right.143  This initial inquiry is 
identical to the initial inquiry in determining whether a particular statute 
contains an implied private cause of action—did Congress intend the 
statutory provision at issue to confer, or create, any right at all?144  The 
Court’s precedents for determining whether Congress intended to create 
                                                          
 134.  Id. 
 135.  Id. 
 136.  Id. 
 137.  Id. 
 138.  See id. at 283–84. 
 139.  Id. at 283. 
 140.  Id. at 284 (citing Alexander v. Sandoval, 532 U.S. 275, 286 (2001)). 
 141.  Id. at 284. 
 142.  Id. at 285. 
 143.  Id. at 283. 
 144.  Id. at 285. 
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a right for the purpose of implying a private cause of action therefore 
control in cases determining whether Congress intended to create a right 
enforceable under § 1983, and vice versa.145 
In advocating for the use of § 1983 to enforce § 602 disparate impact 
regulations, commentators have argued that plaintiffs bear a lighter 
burden in demonstrating the availability of § 1983 than in demonstrating 
that a statute contains an implied private cause of action.146  This 
argument relies on the premise that § 1983 plaintiffs need only satisfy the 
Blessing factors to demonstrate that a federal statute creates a right 
enforceable by § 1983.147  Gonzaga casts doubt upon—or, perhaps, 
rejects—this premise, as it requires a showing of congressional intent to 
create a right.148  Proving congressional intent to create a right is more 
burdensome than satisfying the Blessing factors, but it is identical to the 
initial inquiry in determining whether a federal statute contains an 
implied private cause of action.  Although § 1983 plaintiffs need not 
prove congressional intent to create a private remedy, they, like plaintiffs 
advocating for an implied private cause of action, must prove 
congressional intent to create a right in the first instance. 
In Gonzaga, the Court ultimately held that the statutory provisions at 
issue—the Family Educational Rights and Privacy Act’s (FERPA’s) 
nondisclosure provisions149—do not evince a congressional intent to 
create, or confer, rights and therefore are not enforceable by a § 1983 
action.150  First, the Court noted that FERPA’s nondisclosure provisions 
do not contain any “rights-creating” language that is crucial to finding 
that Congress intended to create a right, whether it be enforceable by an 
implied private cause of action or § 1983.151  The language of FERPA’s 
nondisclosure provisions focuses not on the benefitted class, but on the 
Secretary of Education and how she is to distribute the funds.152  The 
nondisclosure provisions therefore do not confer any right enforceable by 
§ 1983.153 
                                                          
 145.  Id. 
 146.  See Mank, supra note 8, at 353–58 (discussing the importance of congressional intent to 
create a private remedy and § 1983’s explicit authorization of a private cause of action). 
 147.  See id. at 358; see id. at 332–34. 
 148.  Gonzaga, 536 U.S. at 283. 
 149.  20 U.S.C. § 1232g (2006). 
 150.  Gonzaga, 536 U.S. at 290. 
 151.  Id. at 287. 
 152.  Id. 
 153.  Id. 
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The Court’s conclusion that FERPA’s nondisclosure provisions 
confer no individual right was further supported by the fact that those 
provisions speak in terms of a recipient’s policy or practice, rather than 
individual instances, of disclosure.154  This “policy or practice” language 
suggests an aggregate, rather than individual, focus.155  Statutory 
provisions with an aggregate focus cannot give rise to individual 
rights.156 
Congress also chose to expressly provide a mechanism for enforcing 
FERPA’s nondisclosure provisions, which further supported the Court’s 
conclusion that the nondisclosure provisions confer no right enforceable 
by a § 1983 action.157  In FERPA, Congress expressly provided a 
relatively complex mechanism for federal review.158  According to the 
Court, express provision of this relatively complex enforcement 
mechanism counseled against a finding that Congress intended to create 
an “individually enforceable private right[].”159  Furthermore, FERPA 
was amended, four months after being enacted, to provide for a 
centralized review process and avoid conflicting, regional enforcements 
of the nondisclosure provisions.160  The Court reasoned that if Congress 
intended FERPA to be uniformly enforced, and provided a centralized 
review process to ensure that it is, then it is unlikely Congress intended 
to create a right that individuals could enforce by § 1983 actions in state 
and federal courts nationwide, as that would surely lead to the 
nonuniform enforcement the amendment sought to avoid.161 
e. Wright v. City of Roanoke Redevelopment & Housing Authority May 
Stand for the Proposition That Agency Regulations Create or Define 
Statutory Rights 
It has been argued that whether § 602 disparate impact regulations 
are enforceable by § 1983 turns on an interpretation of Wright v. City of 
Roanoke Redevelopment & Housing Authority.162  If Wright is interpreted 
to stand for the proposition that agency regulations can create or define 
                                                          
 154.  Id. at 288. 
 155.  Id. 
 156.  Id. 
 157.  Id. at 289. 
 158.  See id. at 289–90. 
 159.  Id. at 290. 
 160.  Id. (citations omitted). 
 161.  Id. 
 162.  479 U.S. 418 (1987). 
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rights, a § 1983 action may be used to enforce those rights.163  In Wright, 
tenants claimed that Roanoke violated their federal statutory right to pay 
only a certain percentage of their income in rent.164  Roanoke had done 
so by not including utility costs in its rent calculation, which tenants then 
had to pay in addition to rent.165  Agency regulations, not the federal 
statute itself, defined rent to include a reasonable amount for utilities.166  
The Wright Court ultimately concluded that the regulations at issue 
created federal rights enforceable by § 1983.167  Although Wright was 
decided before Blessing, the Court appears to have applied the factors 
later enunciated in Blessing to determine that the regulations created a 
right enforceable by § 1983.168 
To the extent Wright relies on the Blessing factors, it is unlikely to 
provide a basis for finding § 602 disparate impact regulations create 
rights enforceable by § 1983.  Gonzaga requires unambiguous 
congressional intent to create such a right and renders the Blessing 
factors relevant only insofar as they demonstrate such intent.169 
The Wright Court, however, did not rely solely on the Blessing 
factors, assigning weight to (1) the regulation at issue as a valid 
interpretation of the statute and (2) congressional failure to disagree with 
or amend the regulation while amending other parts of the statute.170  
Under Wright, then, congressional failure to amend Title VI to prohibit 
disparate impact regulations while amending other parts of the statute 
may suggest that Congress has accepted such regulations as valid 
interpretations of the statute.171  If the disparate impact regulations are 
valid interpretations of Title VI, § 1983 may be used to enforce them.172 
                                                          
 163.  See Spital, supra note 20, at 115 (describing a dispute in interpretations of Wright, one of 
which asserts that regulations may create § 1983 rights). 
 164.  Wright, 497 U.S. at 420–22. 
 165.  Id. at 421. 
 166.  Id. at 420. 
 167.  Id. at 431. 
 168.  See id. at 430–32 (stating that the regulation contained a mandatory limitation, was 
undeniably intended to benefit the class of which plaintiff was a part, and was not beyond the 
competency of the judiciary to enforce). 
 169.  See supra notes 130–32 and accompanying text.  Spital asserts that regulations may create 
rights so long as they satisfy the Blessing factors.  Spital, supra note 20, at 118.  This assertion, 
however, fails to account for Gonzaga’s move away from the three Blessing factors to the focus on 
unambiguous congressional intent. 
 170.  Wright, 479 U.S. at 430. 
 171.  Spital, supra note 20, at 118. 
 172.  See id. (noting that Gonzaga specifically referred to Title VI as a statute that clearly created 
rights; thus, a valid interpretation of that statute would create or define that right and be enforceable 
by § 1983). 
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C. Use of § 1983 to Enforce Regulations Authorized by Statute: A 
Circuit Split 
As previously noted,173 although the Supreme Court in Sandoval held 
that federal regulations promulgated pursuant to § 602 of Title VI 
prohibiting disparate impact discrimination could not be enforced by an 
implied private cause of action, it appeared to leave open the possibility 
they could be enforced by a § 1983 action.174  Indeed, this possibility has 
created a split in the circuit courts of appeal. 
1. The Majority Position: § 1983 May Not Be Used to Enforce 
Regulations Authorized by Statute 
A majority of the circuits to address the issue have held that 
disparate impact regulations promulgated under § 602—or other 
regulations that are authorized by a given statute—do not create 
individual rights and therefore are not enforceable by a § 1983 action. 
a. Save Our Valley v. Sound Transit 
In Save Our Valley v. Sound Transit,175 the Central Puget Sound 
Regional Transit Authority (Sound Transit) was in charge of building a 
light rail line connecting an area in north Seattle with an airport in Sea-
Tac, Washington.176  The portion of the light rail line that was to pass 
through Seattle’s Rainier Valley, a neighborhood populated 
predominantly by minorities, was to be built at street level, whereas other 
portions of the light rail line that were to pass through neighborhoods 
were to be elevated above street level or built underground.177  Save Our 
Valley brought suit under § 1983, arguing that the plan to build the light 
rail line would have a disproportionately adverse (disparate) impact upon 
minorities.178  Save Our Valley claimed that this was a violation of the 
Department of Transportation’s § 602 regulation prohibiting disparate 
impact discrimination.179  Save Our Valley argued that the § 602 
regulation creates an individual federal right that is enforceable by a 
                                                          
 173.  See supra Part II.B.1.b. 
 174.  See Alexander v. Sandoval, 532 U.S. 275, 293 (2001). 
 175.  335 F.3d 932 (9th Cir. 2003). 
 176.  Id. at 934. 
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 179.  Id. at 934–35. 
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§ 1983 action.180  The district court rejected this argument and granted 
summary judgment to Sound Transit.181 
On appeal, the issue for the Ninth Circuit was whether the 
Department of Transportation’s § 602 disparate impact regulation created 
an individual federal right enforceable by a § 1983 action.182  Resolution 
of this issue turned on the answer to a broader question: “Can a federal 
agency’s regulations ever create individual rights enforceable through § 
1983?”183  The decision in Save Our Valley began by recognizing that the 
circuits were split in answering this question.184 
The Ninth Circuit noted that, on one side of the split, the “Third, 
Fourth, and Eleventh Circuits have held that an agency regulation cannot 
create an individual federal right enforceable through § 1983.”185  
According to the Ninth Circuit, each circuit on this side of the split had 
employed essentially the same reasoning.186  Each circuit had looked to 
the Supreme Court’s § 1983 cases for direction and found that the 
Court’s key consideration in those cases was congressional intent—or 
lack thereof—to create the right that the plaintiff sought to enforce 
through § 1983.187  These circuits understood the Court, in its § 1983 
cases, to treat administrative regulations as “mere ‘administrative 
interpretations of the statute.’”188  As a result, these circuits interpreted 
the Court’s § 1983 cases to establish “the principle that Congress creates 
rights by statute, and that valid regulations merely ‘define’ or ‘flesh out’ 
the contents of those rights.”189  Thus, according to these circuits, 
regulations cannot create individual federal rights independent of those 
created by the statute authorizing the regulations.190 
Each of the circuits that held federal regulations cannot create 
individual federal rights enforceable through § 1983, prior to the Ninth 
Circuit’s decision in Save Our Valley, did so prior to the Supreme 
Court’s decisions in Sandoval and Gonzaga.191  The Ninth Circuit found 
                                                          
 180.  Id. at 935. 
 181.  Id. 
 182.  Id. 
 183.  Id. (emphasis in original). 
 184.  Id. 
 185.  Id. at 936. 
 186.  Id. 
 187.  Id. 
 188.  Id. 
 189.  Id. (quoting S. Camden Citizens in Action v. New Jersey Dep’t of Envtl. Prot., 274 F.3d 
771, 790 (3d Cir. 2001)). 
 190.  Id. 
 191.  Id. at 937. 
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that these Supreme Court decisions strengthened the legal foundation 
underlying the decisions on this side of the circuit split.192  Both 
Sandoval and Gonzaga, according to the Ninth Circuit’s interpretation, 
added support to the proposition that only Congress, by statute, can 
create individual federal rights—which means federal agencies, by 
promulgating regulations, cannot.193  The Ninth Circuit therefore 
concluded that federal agency regulations cannot create individual rights 
enforceable by a § 1983 action.194  As a result, Save Our Valley could not 
bring a § 1983 action to enforce the Department of Transportation’s 
§ 602 disparate impact regulations.195 
b. The Sixth Circuit: A Switch from the Minority Position to the 
Majority Position 
The Ninth Circuit, in Save Our Valley, noted that the Sixth Circuit 
took the minority position that agency regulations can create individual 
rights enforceable through a § 1983 action.196  In Loschiavo v. City of 
Dearborn, the Sixth Circuit took this same position.197  However, the 
Sixth Circuit, in Caswell v. City of Detroit Housing Commission, 
reversed its position, relying on the Supreme Court’s decisions in 
Sandoval and Gonzaga to hold that federal regulations cannot create 
individual federal rights enforceable by a § 1983 action.198  In Johnson v. 
City of Detroit, the Sixth Circuit affirmed that it had reversed course and 
adhered to the position that agency regulations cannot create individual 
federal rights enforceable by a § 1983 action.199 
2. The Minority Position: § 1983 May Be Used to Enforce Agency 
Regulations Authorized by Statute 
Although a majority of circuits to address the issue have held that 
federal regulations authorized by federal statute cannot be enforced by a 
                                                          
 192.  Id. 
 193.  Id. at 937–38. 
 194.  Id. at 939. 
 195.  Id. at 944. 
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 197.  33 F.3d 548, 551 (6th Cir. 1994). 
 198.  418 F.3d 615, 618–19 (6th Cir. 2005). 
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Loschiavo, that a federal regulation alone may create a right enforceable through § 1983, is no longer 
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§ 1983 action, two circuits have found that such regulations can be 
enforced by a § 1983 action. 
a. Samuels v. District of Columbia and the D.C. Circuit: Agency 
Regulations May Create or Define Federal Rights; Thus, § 1983 
Should Be Available to Enforce § 602 Disparate Impact Regulations 
The D.C. Circuit, in Samuels v. District of Columbia, was the first 
circuit to hold that federal regulations could create individual federal 
rights enforceable by an action under § 1983.200  In Samuels, the 
plaintiffs alleged that District of Columbia public housing officials had 
violated Department of Housing and Urban Development (HUD) 
regulations.201 
The D.C. Circuit found that the HUD regulations at issue had the 
“full force and effect of federal law” because “they are issued under a 
congressional directive to implement specific statutory norms and they 
affect individual rights and obligations.”202  The D.C. Circuit also found 
that, under the Supreme Court’s precedent, the “laws” clause of § 1983 is 
broad enough to support a § 1983 action to enforce “federal regulations 
adopted pursuant to a clear congressional mandate that have the full 
force and effect of law.”203  The D.C. Circuit pointed to Supreme Court 
precedent holding that such regulations—those adopted pursuant to a 
clear congressional mandate—have been recognized as part of the body 
of federal law.204  The D.C. Circuit then cited Thiboutot205 for the 
proposition that § 1983 provides a remedy for a violation of any federal 
law, not just some subsets of federal laws.206 
It is noteworthy that the D.C. Circuit decided Samuels in 1985 so it 
could only base its decision on cases decided before 1985.  Obviously, 
the Supreme Court as well as lower courts have decided cases involving 
both Title VI and § 1983 since 1985.  Some of these post-1985 cases 
may cast doubt on the validity of the D.C. Circuit’s decision in Samuels, 
but not necessarily, and Samuels has not been overruled.  Furthermore, 
the D.C. Circuit is not the only circuit to find that federal regulations 
                                                          
 200.  770 F.2d 184, 199 (D.C. Cir. 1985). 
 201.  Id. 
 202.  Id. 
 203.  Id. 
 204.  Id. 
 205.  448 U.S. 1; see supra Part II.B.2.a. 
 206.  Samuels, 770 F.2d at 199. 
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may create individual federal rights enforceable through § 1983, and 
another circuit has so found as recently as 2002. 
b. Robinson v. Kansas and the Tenth Circuit: § 1983 Is Available to 
Enforce § 602 Disparate Impact Regulations 
In 2002, in the case of Robinson v. Kansas, the Tenth Circuit found 
that a § 1983 action, brought against state officials and seeking 
prospective injunctive relief, may be used to enforce § 602 disparate 
impact regulations.207  In Robinson, the plaintiffs challenged Kansas’s 
school-financing scheme, claiming that the scheme and its enforcement 
had a discriminatory disparate impact on minority students and students 
who are not of United States origin.208  The plaintiffs argued that this was 
a violation of § 602 disparate impact regulations and sought to enforce 
those regulations through a § 1983 action.209 
The Tenth Circuit first noted that the Supreme Court’s decision in 
Sandoval prohibited a private cause of action under Title VI to enforce 
the § 602 disparate impact regulations.210  The Tenth Circuit then plainly 
stated that the § 602 disparate impact regulations are enforceable by a 
§ 1983 action brought against state officials and seeking prospective 
injunctive relief.211  The Tenth Circuit, however, offered no explanation 
for why it found that the § 602 disparate impact regulations are 
enforceable by a § 1983 action.212 
III. ANALYSIS 
Courts, and ultimately the Supreme Court, should allow the use of a 
§ 1983 action to enforce § 602 regulations prohibiting disparate impact 
discrimination.  There are three primary reasons for this.  First, the use of 
§ 1983 actions to enforce § 602 disparate impact regulations replaces an 
overly formalistic approach to Title VI with a much more functionalist 
approach.  This functionalist approach is much better able to meet the 
overall goals and purpose of Title VI. 
                                                          
 207.  295 F.3d 1183, 1187 (10th Cir. 2002). 
 208.  Id. at 1186. 
 209.  Id. at 1187. 
 210.  Id. at 1186–87. 
 211.  Id. at 1187. 
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Second, as a legal matter, use of § 1983 actions to enforce § 602 
disparate impact regulations fits within the Supreme Court’s precedents.  
Section 1983 may only be used to enforce federal rights secured by the 
Constitution and federal laws.  It is plausible, given the text and structure 
of Title VI, that disparate impact regulations promulgated under § 602 
establish or define individual federal rights enforceable by a § 1983 
action. 
Finally, use of the § 1983 action to enforce § 602 disparate impact 
regulations is warranted because the need for a mechanism to enforce 
those regulations arises in the first instance only because of an untenable 
distinction between “intentional” and “disparate impact” discrimination.  
Because it may be impossible to distinguish between intentional and 
disparate impact discrimination, it makes little sense to prevent only 
intentional discrimination. 
A. A More Functionalist Approach Is Preferred to the Current, Overly 
Formalistic Approach Because it Better Achieves the Overall Goals 
and Purpose of Title VI 
As outlined in Part II, the Supreme Court has set up a complex 
framework of legal rules governing Title VI.  Under this framework, 
Title VI does not provide a private cause of action to enforce § 602 
regulations prohibiting disparate impact discrimination.213  Even if this 
proposition is accepted as settled law, a § 1983 action should be allowed 
to enforce § 602 disparate impact regulations.  Allowing a § 1983 action 
to enforce such regulations represents a far more functionalist approach 
to the issue than the current, overly formalistic approach taken by the 
Supreme Court in the context of implied private causes of action.  The 
more functionalist approach better achieves the overall goals and purpose 
of Title VI. 
Before addressing any of the legal rules surrounding Title VI, it is 
helpful to understand the overall goals and purpose of Title VI.  Such an 
understanding is helpful because legal rules governing Title VI should be 
formulated to further its overall goals and purpose, not run contrary to 
them.  The legislative history of Title VI clearly demonstrates its overall 
goals and purpose. 
According to Senator John Pastore, “[Title VI] has a simple 
purpose—to eliminate discrimination in federally financed programs.”214  
                                                          
 213.  See supra note 47 and accompanying text. 
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It is noteworthy that that there are no qualifications to the type of 
discrimination Congress sought to eliminate.  President John F. Kennedy, 
in encouraging Congress to pass what would eventually become Title VI, 
stated the following: 
Simple justice requires that public funds, to which all taxpayers of all 
races contribute, not be spent in any fashion which encourages, 
entrenches, subsidizes, or results in racial discrimination.  Direct 
discrimination by Federal, State, or local governments is prohibited by 
the Constitution.  But indirect discrimination, through the use of 
Federal funds, is just as invidious; and it should not be necessary to 
resort to the courts to prevent each individual violation.215 
These statements make clear that the purpose of Title VI was, and is, 
to eliminate racial discrimination in federally financed programs.  
Neither statement contains an adjective—like “intentional”—modifying 
the type of discrimination Title VI was intended to eliminate.  In fact, 
President Kennedy’s statement demonstrates a clear intention to prohibit 
distribution of federal funds that results in racial discrimination—and 
spending that simply results in racial discrimination is precisely the 
disparate impact discrimination prohibited by § 602 disparate impact 
regulations. 
Given the evidence in Senator Pastore’s statement that Title VI was 
intended to eliminate all types of racial discrimination—not just 
intentional discrimination—and the evidence in President Kennedy’s 
statement that Title VI was intended to eliminate even disparate impact 
discrimination, it is clear that Title VI was intended to be interpreted 
broadly.  In other words, Title VI was to be interpreted so as to reach, 
and eliminate, all forms of racial discrimination, including disparate 
impact discrimination, in programs receiving federal funding.  Thus, 
legal rules adopted to govern Title VI should further this purpose. 
Because the Supreme Court in Sandoval foreclosed the possibility of 
an implied private cause of action in Title VI to enforce § 602 disparate 
impact regulations,216 a § 1983 action should be allowed to enforce them.  
If neither an implied private cause of action nor a § 1983 action is 
available to enforce § 602 disparate impact regulations, there is no 
mechanism by which individuals may enforce the very regulations that 
are intended to protect them.  Federally funded entities would be able to 
racially discriminate by distributing funds in a manner that simply 
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 216.  See supra Part II.B.1.b. 
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resulted in discrimination on the basis of race, so long as the funds were 
not expressly distributed on the basis of race in the first instance.  The 
Sandoval Court, in its overly formalistic approach, failed to consider or 
appreciate this possibility and did nothing to further Title VI’s overall 
purpose of eliminating all forms of racial discrimination in federally 
funded programs.  Thus, a § 1983 action should be allowed to enforce 
§ 602 disparate impact regulations and thereby better serve Title VI’s 
overall goals and purpose. 
B. Because Disparate Impact Regulations Promulgated Pursuant to 
§ 602 Are Intended to Effectuate the Antidiscrimination Provision of 
§ 601, Those Regulations Create Individual Federal Rights and 
Should Be Enforceable through § 1983 
As a legal matter, the key inquiry in determining whether § 602 
disparate impact regulations may be enforced by a § 1983 action 
involves a two-step analysis.  First, one must consider whether § 602 
disparate impact regulations create or define a federal right.  As noted 
above, this requires, pursuant to Gonzaga v. Doe, unambiguous 
congressional intent to confer an individual federal right.217  Second, one 
must consider whether the right is one for which § 1983 was intended to 
provide a remedy or enforcement mechanism.218  As previously noted, 
however, if a federal right exists, § 1983 is presumed to be available as a 
remedy or enforcement mechanism.219 
Beginning with the text of Title VI, the statute itself draws no 
distinction between intentional and disparate impact discrimination.  The 
statute prohibits only “discrimination” without any adjective.220  The 
Supreme Court noted in Gonzaga that Title VI has been found to confer 
an individual right—the right to be free from the prohibited 
discrimination—because the text of the statute is focused on the 
protected class.221  Thus, the Supreme Court, in a case that established a 
more stringent standard for determining whether a statute confers 
individual rights, cited Title VI, specifically, as an example of a statute 
that confers individual rights.222  This, coupled with the fact that the text 
of Title VI does not limit the discrimination prohibition to intentional 
                                                          
 217.  See supra Part II.B.2.d. 
 218.  See supra Part II.B.2.c. 
 219.  See supra Part II.B.2.c. 
 220.  See supra Part II.A.1. 
 221.  Gonzaga Univ. v. Doe, 536 U.S. 273, 284 (2002). 
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discrimination, clearly evinces a congressional intent to create a right to 
be free from all types of discrimination.  Because this right includes the 
rights to be free from disparate impact discrimination, a § 1983 action 
should be available to enforce § 602 disparate impact regulations that 
create or define that right. 
In foreclosing the availability of an implied private cause of action to 
enforce § 602 disparate impact regulations, the Sandoval Court accorded 
significant, if not dispositive, weight to the fact that the language of 
§ 602 focuses on the regulating federal agencies, as opposed to § 601’s 
focus on the class of persons protected by Title VI.223  According to the 
Court’s reasoning, statutory provisions focusing on the regulating 
agencies, rather than the protected class, evince no congressional intent 
to create rights.224  Although this may be true under the Court’s 
precedent, the Sandoval Court ignored § 602’s reference to § 601 in 
making this assertion. 
Section 602 explicitly authorizes federal agencies to promulgate 
regulations that “effectuate the provisions of [§ 601],”225 thereby 
importing § 601’s focus on the protected class into § 602.  Because the 
§ 602 regulations are to effectuate the provisions of § 601, Congress 
clearly intended such regulations to be promulgated for the benefit of the 
protected class.  It is difficult to see, then, how § 602 lacks the “rights-
creating” language—language focused on the benefitted class—that 
evinces congressional intent to create rights.  If § 601 evinces 
congressional intent to, and does in fact, create individual rights, then 
§ 602 must also evince congressional intent to either (1) create rights or 
(2) define rights—by promulgation of agency regulations effectuating 
§ 601—created by § 601.  Because the Gonzaga Court recognized that 
§ 601 creates individual rights,226 it follows logically that § 602 either (1) 
creates rights or (2) defines the rights created by § 601. 
Title VI, furthermore, not only authorizes federal agencies to 
promulgate regulations under § 602, but directs federal agencies to do 
so.227  Had Congress merely authorized, rather than directed, federal 
agencies to promulgate regulations effectuating the provisions of § 601, 
one could reasonably argue that the regulations do not create or define 
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 225.  42 U.S.C. § 2000d-1 (2006) (emphasis added). 
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any rights whatsoever.  If Congress intended the regulations to create or 
define rights protected by Title VI, it is unlikely that the regulations 
would be optional.  Thus, the fact that Congress actually directed federal 
agencies to promulgate regulations effectuating the antidiscrimination 
provision of § 601 evinces congressional intent to create or define—
through the promulgation of agency regulations—the scope of rights 
encompassed in § 601. 
Congress, in § 601, sought generally to eliminate discrimination in 
federally funded programs and thereby created a right to be free from the 
prohibited discrimination.  In § 602, Congress directed federal agencies 
to promulgate regulations giving substance to this general goal.  Thus, if 
§ 602 regulations prohibiting disparate impact discrimination were 
necessary to effectuate the antidiscriminatory provision of § 601, such 
regulations would create, or define, rights encompassed in and protected 
by § 601.  These rights, as created or defined by § 602 regulations, 
should be enforceable by a § 1983 action. 
C. Because the Current Distinction Between “Intentional” and 
“Disparate Impact” Discrimination Is Untenable, § 1983 Should Be 
Available to Enforce § 602 Disparate Impact Regulations so That All 
Forms of Discrimination May Be Eliminated 
The need for a § 1983 action to enforce § 602 regulations prohibiting 
disparate impact discrimination arises only because of the distinction 
between intentional and disparate impact discrimination.  If, in accord 
with the intent of Congress, the Supreme Court had broadly interpreted 
Title VI to reach and eliminate all forms of discrimination, then an 
implied private cause of action would be available to enforce the right to 
be free from both intentional and disparate impact discrimination.228  The 
Supreme Court, however, has not interpreted Title VI in the broad 
manner its drafters intended. 
As outlined above, the Supreme Court has held that § 601 of Title VI 
reaches only intentional discrimination.229  Disparate impact 
discrimination is reached only by § 602 regulations.230  Because the 
implied private cause of action contained in Title VI may only be used to 
enforce § 601’s ban on intentional discrimination,231 an alternative 
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mechanism, such as § 1983, is needed to enforce § 602 disparate impact 
regulations.  However, the distinction between intentional and disparate 
impact discrimination is untenable, and use of § 1983 to enforce § 602 
disparate impact regulations is therefore warranted to ensure that both 
forms of discrimination are effectively prohibited. 
Intentional discrimination is understood to encompass any policy 
that expressly guides distribution of federal funds on the basis of race.232  
Disparate impact discrimination is understood to encompass policies that 
do not expressly guide distribution of federal funds on the basis of race 
but, nonetheless, result in a disproportionally adverse, or disparate, 
impact upon certain racial groups.233  The first hypothetical policy in Part 
I—expressly distributing funds on the basis of race—is an example of 
so-called intentional discrimination.  The second hypothetical policy in 
Part I—distributing funds based on the size of student organizations, but 
resulting in no funding to groups composed primarily of racial 
minorities—is an example of so-called disparate impact discrimination.  
Although the distinction between intentional and disparate impact 
discrimination may make sense as a logical matter, it is untenable as a 
practical matter.  This is so because “intentional” speaks to a state of 
mind, but a state of mind may easily be disguised, leaving disparate 
impact as the only evidence of intentional discrimination. 
An entity receiving federal funds may intentionally discriminate on 
the basis of race and yet do so without engaging in so-called intentional 
discrimination.  Such an entity need only find a proxy for race and 
distribute funds based on that proxy.234  The result would be that funds 
are distributed in a manner that results in racial discrimination—which is 
the definition of disparate impact discrimination.  Disparate impact 
discrimination therefore can be intentional, which renders untenable, as a 
practical matter, the distinction between intentional and disparate impact 
discrimination.  Even if one accepts the proposition that Title VI contains 
an implied private cause of action that reaches only intentional 
discrimination, it is undeniable that in at least some instances the only 
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evidence of intentional discrimination is evidence of disparate impact on 
particular racial groups.235  If, however, a prohibition on discrimination 
that merely results in racial discrimination is not enforceable by a private 
cause of action, then at least some instances of intentional discrimination 
cannot, and will not, be eliminated.  Thus, there needs to be a private 
cause of action to enforce § 602 regulations prohibiting disparate impact 
regulations.  Because the Sandoval Court has foreclosed the possibility 
of an implied private cause of action in Title VI to enforce § 602 
disparate impact regulations,236 a § 1983 action should be allowed to 
enforce such regulations. 
IV. CONCLUSION 
Legal rules, no matter how black and white they may appear, do not 
operate in a vacuum and may be subject to manipulation in the real-
world context in which they operate.  Such is the case with Title VI and 
the legal rules that flow from it.  The Supreme Court has made clear that 
§ 601 of Title VI reaches only intentional discrimination.  As a result, the 
implied private cause of action contained in Title VI may only be used to 
enforce § 601’s prohibition on intentional discrimination. 
The private cause of action that exists in Title VI cannot be used to 
enforce § 602 regulations prohibiting disparate impact discrimination.  
This leaves entities receiving federal funding free to engage in racial 
discrimination, so long as they are able to find a race-neutral proxy 
allowing them to do so.  Because the purpose of Title VI is to protect 
individuals from discrimination based on race, color, or national origin, 
the law should not be overly formalistic and ignore real-world actors 
who are technically complying with the requirements of Title VI—by not 
intentionally discriminating based on race—but are undermining its very 
purpose—by adopting facially race-neutral policies that have a disparate 
impact on particular minority groups. 
The § 1983 action is a viable alternative mechanism to enforce § 602 
disparate impact regulations.  The § 1983 action is intended as an 
enforcement mechanism for rights secured by federal statute.  Title VI, a 
federal statute, confers upon individuals the right to be free from all 
types of discrimination.  This includes intentional forms of 
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discrimination, which are covered by § 601, as well as forms of 
discrimination that may appear to be unintentional on their face but have 
the same discriminatory effect, which are covered by § 602 disparate 
impact regulations.  As both are individual rights secured by Title VI, a 
federal statute, the § 1983 action should be available to enforce both of 
them. 
 
